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Traditional music must remain; it is a base and we listen to it. But 
the logic of our music is different. Traditional music is to show the 
identity of the people, their huwiya, but that is not the intention of 
our music. Our music is to show the problems of a people and how 
to get rid of them… Rap is poetry that is sung in a specific way. It’s 
poetry. It is the music of change.
Katiba 5, Shatila, Beirut, 20111
In the broad sense, I speak of an “aesthetic of the political,” to indicate 
that politics is first of all a battle about perceptible/sensible material.
Jacques Rancière, 20002 
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Katiba 5 is a Palestinian hip-hop band of young Palestinian refugees, together 
with Lebanese friends and second generation French-Syrians living in Europe. 
They meet in a smoky little room with walls covered with resistance graffiti, 
and floors strewn with musical instruments, on the outskirts of Shatila camp 
in Lebanon. Katiba 5 is one of the many art experiences of refugee youth 
in Lebanon that signal a radical shift in the relationship between culture 
and resistance in the Palestinian landscape. These young artists partake in 
the emergence of a counter or subculture that is at once local and transna-
tional. They speak through a global genre, hip-hop, to express their anger at 
political and social predicaments in Lebanon and beyond, but they display 
no neat ideology or political project. Rather, they state that they compose 
rap by integrating the plurality of their views. This is one of the ways that 
they deviate from previous and more conventional nationalist genres that 
they perceive as “traditional,” to quote a band member. 
Palestinian cultural production historically echoed and shaped a 
national identity struggling to survive.5 Both Palestinian resistance and 
its cultural production have a long history, as Maha Nassar notes in this 
special issue of the journal. Yet, with the establishment of the Palestine 
Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1964, much Palestinian art became more 
systematically a platform for the nationalist resistance movement. The PLO’s 
revolutionary 1960s and 1970s period saw the birth of what many now 
consider highlights of “classical” Palestinian art forms, such as Ghassan 
Kanafani’s literature, Mahmoud Darwish’s poems, and Suleiman Mansour’s 
paintings. These works voiced the nationalist aspirations of the Palestinian 
people, and often endeavored to depict their trauma of refugeehood and 
exile. The 1993 Oslo accords and the subsequent period of supposed state 
and “peace” building, however, signaled the emergence of a new political 
era. The Palestinian Authority (PA) had a contradictory double position: it 
sponsored “resistance culture,” on the one hand, and “normalized” the very 
occupying power that was being resisted, on the other. This new scenario 
had broad implications for Palestinian cultures of resistance, their forms, 
and the politics they conveyed.
As our own interviews with young Palestinian artists in Lebanon, as 
well as other research, have highlighted,6 post-Oslo Palestinian art had now 
to engage with a matrix of intersecting forms of control, as exercised by, 
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first and foremost, Israeli occupation forces, but also the PA, the refugees’ 
host states, humanitarianism, and neoliberal economic forces. In parallel, 
Palestinian artists engaged in an ongoing process of experimenting with 
new languages, symbols, and aesthetics. When we asked members of Katiba 
5 how the outputs of their band compare  to previous “classic” Palestinian  
resistance genres, such as the early writings of the late Mahmoud Darwish, 
the answers were revealing: “[Rap music] allowed the nationalist songs to 
evolve; [it is] a new modified form of nationalist music. [But] it’s the same 
themes of suffering.”7 Another member of the band vehemently expressed 
the specificity of Katiba 5’s rap: “[I]t relies on words [haki], we talk about 
socio-political issues, about youth [shabab] like us, about Palestinians living 
in Lebanon. . . . We spoke about the NGO system [jam‘iyyat] and they are 
bastards. . . . This is the perspective of the ordinary people.”8
These young artists/activists acknowledge the importance of established 
political-nationalist genres, which they consider part of their heritage, but 
they also underscore that cultural production shifts in conjunction with 
political developments and contingencies. Moreover, they also privilege 
ordinary people’s views in their lyrics. The suffering of the people is ongoing, 
but the sources of oppression and the ways of expressing their plights vary.
Cultures of Resistance
These movements in Palestinian cultural production, and more specifically 
in Palestinian cultures of resistance, are witness to the close connection 
between art and politics. Yet most mainstream academic literature on the 
Arab world’s political systems and cultures tends to pay scarce attention 
to the culture-politics nexus. Although there are notable exceptions,9 the 
focus on formal politics, high-level diplomacy, political parties, and NGOs 
continues to prevail in many studies, which have consequently neglected 
alternative, informal political expressions and subaltern political subjectivi-
ties. For example, despite the large number of studies that complicate and 
nuance the picture of the spaces, places, and actors of the “political” in Arab 
and Middle East contexts,10 mainstream definitions of civil society remained 
biased towards a notion that privileges the “mélange of associations, clubs, 
guilds, syndicates, federations, parties, and groups that come together to 
provide a buffer between state and citizen.”11 Such an understanding largely 
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overlooks less formal avenues of affiliation and participation, as well as other 
modes of dissent and resistance, including the cultural.  
This emphasis on political parties, elections, and formal associations 
may stem from the predominance of largely male-dominated approaches 
of Western political science over feminist methods of problematization. 
Anthropologists of the Middle East have been particularly active in over-
hauling such dominant paradigms. Yet these perspectives persist and 
continue to reflect Orientalist assumptions that Middle Eastern societies 
need to adopt certain forms of governance in order to “graduate” to being 
full-fledged democracies. 
With the popular uprisings that erupted in several countries across 
the Middle East and North Africa from 2011 onwards, street protests—in 
the form of ordinary people’s creative and challenging artistic expressions—
could no longer be left unnoticed. From Tahrir Square to Gezi Park, public 
spaces came to be inhabited by graffiti, music, art, and performances, which 
engendered and conveyed new affective and political ties. Academic and 
non-academic writing increasingly emphasized the pervasiveness of art 
and music in streets, squares, factories, and neighborhoods where crowds 
gathered and protests assembled. 
Yet some observers were too quick to celebrate artistic and cultural 
production as a driving force of the recent uprisings and as naturally defiant 
and oppositional.12 In fact, the artistic productions stemming from and 
deployed as soundtracks of the political protests were varied and complex. 
Even when they were explicitly calling for a radical change of existing 
social and political orders, the oppositional and disruptive potential of 
these artistic expressions has sometimes been at risk of neutralization at 
the hands of political co-optation or market commodification. In a similar 
vein, protest art proved to be resistant to some oppressive structures, while 
contributing to strengthening others at the same time. Thus, protest art 
revealed the potential to challenge one established aesthetic regime, while 
simultaneously conforming to another.
Moreover, the unprecedented and enthusiastic interest in the political 
facets of protest art has often overlooked the performative or affective dimension 
of music, graffiti, and poetry in the highly political, but also emotional 
moments that occurred in places such as Tahrir Square or Gezi Park. Rap, 
graffiti, stencils, songs, music, plays, and slogans of the uprisings did not 
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necessarily carry clear militant messages. They sometimes operated as 
affective or performative arenas activating political subjectivity in their own 
terms, rather than merely visualizing or echoing political events or slogans.13 
Mona Abaza notes, for example, how the graffiti in Muhammad 
Mahmud Street in Cairo documented and narrated the battlefields. The 
graffiti offered a “dramaturgy of the revolution” and gave the possibility 
to an absent audience to “be there.” It also infused Muhammad Mahmud 
Street with a new meaning and purpose. After the revolution, plastic chairs 
transformed the street into an open-air, informal café, where ordinary 
people sat drinking tea and observing the events unfolding around them: 
“It seemed that those who sat at these cafés, gazing for hours at the life 
of Tahrir Square while sipping their tea, were watching a performance 
free-of-charge.”14 Similarly, Ted Swedenburg argues that protest music on 
Tahrir Square aimed “to move the crowds (and the musicians themselves) 
into a sentimental or affective state, such as anger, mourning, nostalgia or 
patience.”15 The meanings of the songs “were not just already inherent in 
the lyrics and melody or in the associated memories and resonances, but … 
were also forged in performance.”16
Rather than considering protest art as singularly revolutionary, disrup-
tive, or unsettling to established power structures per se, this special issue 
explores the complex relation between cultural politics, aesthetics, affect, and 
resistance. Many of the articles contextualize the ambivalent and nuanced 
relationship between works of art, culture, and resistance within wider, 
constantly shifting, multiple, hegemonic discourses, and power structures. 
These contributions cast a skeptical eye on the notion of resistance. They 
complicate our understanding of how political and economic contingen-
cies, colonialism, neoliberal market-driven policies, and global and local 
discourses can work to normalize, appropriate, co-opt, and commodify 
protest art and resistance. Moreover, they shed light on the transformative 
potential of art that focuses on the ordinary, or activates affective ties by 
disrupting hegemonic imaginaries and sensibilities.
“Resistance” and the Transnational Social Life of Artwork
The study of resistance, revolutions, and varied forms of protest is central to 
many disciplines. It is, however, mainly anthropologists who trace informal 
manifestations of resistance, micro-politics, the political cultures that emerge 
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in mundane and everyday acts, and who analyze how they challenge the 
macro-political level.17 Some critics have even argued that the notions of 
resistance and hegemony have come “to monopolize the anthropological 
imagination,” thus losing their analytical utility.18 
This state of affairs may have resulted from a sometimes uncritical 
adoption of Michel Foucault’s position that “[w]here there is power, there 
is resistance, and yet, or rather consequently, this resistance is never in a 
position of exteriority in relation to power.”19 What follows is that every 
act (dressing, eating, gestures) might potentially be a form of resistance.20 
Attempting to redress this bias, Lila Abu-Lughod long ago warned against 
“romanticizing resistance,” and suggested instead that scholars study resistance 
as a “diagnostic of power.”21 Such an approach helps us to better understand 
the material and ideational matrix of power in which and against which 
actors are strategizing and resisting. Sherry Ortner similarly stressed her 
discomfort with resistance studies and suggested the need for a “thick 
description”22 of the broader political, cultural, and economic contexts in 
which cultures of resistance emerge, as well as the internal politics and sub-
jectivities of those who produce, market, and consume them.23 In addition, 
artwork has a social life that extends beyond borders, as the contributions 
by Hanan Toukan and Yazid Anani, Craig Larkin, Rania Jawwad, Maha 
Nassar, and Miriyam Aouragh and Helga Tawil-Souri highlight in this 
special issue. Global market forces, discourses, and transnational political 
solidarity campaigns can help circulate, but also commodify, co-opt, or 
empty protest art of its political message, leading to depoliticization and 
possibly normalization. 
A case in point is Tunisian rap artist El Général. The mainstream 
media celebrated him as the voice of the Tunisian uprising and described his 
song “Rais Lebled” which directly targeted former president Zine El Abidine 
Ben Ali, as the “anthem” of the revolution.24 It is interesting to compare the 
circulation and “social life” of El Général’s art to the rap of his counterpart 
Psycho M, whose songs contain many Islamic religious references. While 
El Général’s largely secular and outspokenly anti-regime lyrics attracted 
a broad international audience and circulated globally, Psycho M’s music 
found little international support or audience.25 The transnational or global 
trajectory and consumption of music infringes upon local meanings and 
registers, promoting some music to resistance art while condemning others 
as forces of stagnation.
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The poststructuralist emphasis on power as decentralized risks 
overlooking how power structures and market dynamics set the frames 
and the boundaries in which artistic productions and related political 
subjectivities can emerge (and be seen by different audiences) as oppositional 
forces. In this light, Aouragh and Tawil-Souri’s contribution to this issue 
underlines the need to study cultures of resistance in their original context as 
a diagnosis of power. Their analysis of “internet activism” in the Palestinian 
context contends that the internet can indeed be an empowering space for 
grassroots activism. At the same time, online activism, and its empowering 
potential, requires a dialectical understanding of both settler colonialism 
and what the authors term “cyber-colonialism.” 
In his article on graffiti and commercial advertising on the apartheid 
wall in the West Bank, Larkin similarly argues that there is a global lan-
guage for resistance and solidarity that is at times at odds with the local one. 
Local, material, mundane realities and needs can influence how different 
audiences and subjects make use of the wall and its public nature. At one 
extreme, rather than painting graffiti, many Palestinians find that com-
mercial advertising on the separation wall better enables them to resist the 
material disenfranchisement ensuing from the occupation and from Israel’s 
multiple devices for fragmenting their land and lives. Just as with any act 
of resistance, studying cultures of resistance thus necessitates situating the 
artwork, music, internet, or other forms of creative protest in the global 
and local material and structural contexts which enable and constrain 
them. Only in doing so can we gain a more nuanced understanding of their 
transformative potential.
“Culture” and Counter-Hegemony
The interpretation of “culture” and “cultural meanings” has long marked 
Middle Eastern scholarship, especially through the contributions by classic 
anthropology on systems of kinship, religious beliefs, rituals, and social 
structures, as well as, more recently, on popular culture, media production, 
and consumption. Cultural studies, on the other hand, only more recently 
started to influence the vast literature on the Middle East.26 Rebecca Stein 
and Ted Swedenburg have noted a lack of thorough engagement with the 
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culture-politics nexus in this literature, especially in the context of Palestine/
Israel.27 Even when the field of cultural studies was center stage, it tended 
to be heavily influenced by Marxist political economy approaches or a 
nation-state-centered paradigm. These views either understand power and 
resistance through an economistic, class-based angle, or one where the state 
and its bureaucratic institutions are the main enforcers of power. Both the 
political economy and the nation-state approaches thus consider cultural 
politics as a binary or a byproduct of the economic and the political. 
Similarly, our emphasis in this issue on the material context of occupa-
tion and settler colonialism does not propose the cultural as epiphenomenal 
to the political. Rather, in line with Stein and Swedenburg, we consider the 
political, economic, and cultural to be closely intertwined and mutually 
constitutive. In the context of Palestine, Helga Tawil-Souri has elsewhere 
argued that the specific relation between the political and the cultural 
“coerc[es] the political back into cultural studies.”28 Taking issue with the fact 
that “on the whole, contemporary studies of culture are often void of larger 
political discussions,” Tawil-Souri foregrounds the political. She explains 
“that the spatial-political conditions of Palestinians function similarly to the 
‘base’ and do in many ways determine the ‘superstructure’ of the cultural 
realm.”29 The Palestinian case of continued settler colonialism, political 
violence, and more recently the PA’s adoption of neoliberal policies neces-
sitates the integration of complex and layered axes of political oppression 
into any analysis of cultures of resistance. The contributions by Toukan and 
Anani, as well as by Aouragh and Tawil-Souri articulate this integration.
The Gramscian attention to the role of the state and other authorities 
or institutions in forging norms, beliefs, and practices to promote cultural 
hegemony without the need for overt coercion is also crucial to this special 
issue.30 States and national elites in the Middle East (including Israel) rely 
heavily and strategically on cultural production. Often artworks, be they 
music, paintings, poems, or other genres, function to construct, reify, and 
normalize national(-ist), patriarchal, or tribal identities and ideologies. 
Contributions in this special issue interrogate when art and cultural pro-
duction become oppositional and subversive tools and highlight how they 
dissent from and unmask hegemonic cultures in contexts of authoritarianism, 
censorship, occupation, and violence.
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Many artistic expressions of the Arab uprisings contained clear and 
vigorous anti-regime slogans that demonstrated the disruptive potential 
of political art. For example, the powerful graffiti on Cairo’s Muhammad 
Mahmud Street reflects the resistance of protest artists who did not succumb 
to Egyptian authorities’ industrious attempts to erase their work, strenu-
ously repainting and rewriting on those whitewashed walls. Similarly, the 
writings by political prisoners in the darkest Moroccan “years of lead” that 
Brahim El-Guabli explores in this issue, operated as “hidden transcripts 
of resistance,” defeating the oppressive hand of the regime’s prisons. State 
censorship and sponsorship of cultural production are thus a response to 
art’s revolutionary potential.31 
Art can dissent in less explicit ways, however. Tripp suggests that 
there are three specific links between artistic interventions and the politics 
of resistance. Firstly, art “has a powerful way of signaling presence” and 
“reclaiming public space,” and thus can show the limits of the centralist 
state. Secondly, artistic interventions create “a powerful shared vocabu-
lary” that can foster solidarities and collective identities. Finally, art can 
create “a common, mutually reinforcing imagery” which might challenge 
established hegemonic narratives and create alternative interpretations and 
imaginaries of past, present, and future.32 “Resistance art,” for Tripp, does 
not only challenge the status quo through alternative political messages. It 
may also disrupt established hegemonic aesthetic forms or act as visualized 
evidence of political, social, and cultural imaginaries and identities that 
counter those that regimes impose.
The significance of the Arab uprisings’ cultural production might lie 
exactly in their potential to disrupt established state-led cultural regimes 
of knowledge. As Ives Gonzalez-Quijano notes, the creativity of the upris-
ings might “represent the prelude to a new phase in the cultural history of 
the modern Arab world, a phase that might enable new players to elaborate 
artistic propositions to new audiences, bypassing the mediation of ‘learned 
elites.’”33 This perspective echoes the view of celebrated graffiti protest artist 
‘Ammar Abu Bakr who suggested that the revolutionary moment of artwork 
resides in producing culture that is situated “outside of the old boundaries.” 
In his powerful words: 
Today, in the midst of our revolution, I would not be content to offer 
something in a gallery. Who goes to a gallery to see art? Maybe you 
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or me, or people willing to pay for it, but nobody else. What about the 
people for whom we came out to protest? The people we have belonged 
to since before the revolution?34 
The significance of the Arab uprisings’ creative and artistic initiatives thus 
lies not only in their attempts to overthrow the political systems, but also 
in their endeavor to undermine and challenge the existing elites’ cultural 
hegemony. These artistic proposals might signal a reordering of the top-
down state- and elite-led culture industry in the Arab world in favor of a 
model that allows for alternative aesthetic expressions and new cultural 
politics to emerge as forces of change. 
On “Dissensus” and “Dismantling the Flag”
French philosopher Jacques Rancière has famously theorized how art and 
aesthetics are integral to the construction of community identities. It is 
Rancière’s notion of “dissensus,” in particular, that connects the political 
and the aesthetic: “A dissensus is not a conflict of interests, opinions, or 
values; it is a division inserted in ‘common sense’: a dispute over what is 
given and about the frame within which we see something as given.”35 While 
“consensus” reduces politics to authoritarian actions of “the police” and, as 
such, is not politics, the essence of the political, according to Rancière, is to 
be found in “dissensus.” Art, by disrupting the senses, as well as consensual 
and established aesthetic forms, can dissent and perform the political in 
the most radical ways. 
Yet Rancière is also critical of attributing a direct causal relationship 
to art and politics. Not “everything is political,”36 and one must be par-
ticularly suspicious of art that explicitly wants to emancipate a supposedly 
ignorant passive spectator. In The Emancipated Spectator,  Rancière critiques 
self-proclaimed “political” art, which wants to teach the spectator through 
political messages. He argues that such art did not actually produce new 
political or revolutionary subjectivities, but merely relied on revolutionary 
ideologies.37 “Resistance,” “revolutionary,” or “political” art might thus not 
be so resistant, revolutionary, or political after all. “Political” art can also 
become integrated into established institutionalized cultural networks, 
which are often sustained by market relations. As we have already suggested, 
some of the uprisings’ cultural productions might indeed have followed 
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such a trajectory of co-optation and integration into established cultural 
industries. Criteria for political art therefore do not merely lie in the art’s 
explicit message and form, but in art’s ability to rework “the frame of our 
perceptions and the dynamism of our affects,” and to generate new forms 
of political subjectivity.38
Much recent post-Oslo Palestinian cultural production breaches 
“common sense” and urges a reworking of “the frame of our perceptions” 
in Rancière’s terms. Focusing on the powerful paradoxes of everyday 
normal(ized) life under occupation, this art often proposes cynical, humorous, 
or ironic genres to engage the dark reality of occupation and siege.  This is 
not to claim that humor or irony are post-Oslo phenomena, nor that the 
Israeli occupation and military attacks have become a mere joke. 
On the contrary: as Sharif Kanaana39 notes, during the first intifada 
jokes and humorous registers were ubiquitous. They even gave birth to a new 
genre that he defines as “intifada humor,” which was tied to resistance and 
mainly targeted the Israeli army. The jokes that Kanaana collected show the 
powerful, vernacular, and subversive ways through which ordinary people, 
often women and children, ridiculed the occupiers and represented the reality 
beneath the one imposed on them. Humor and jokes circulated extensively 
in pre-intifada times as well, but they also differed in genre and spirit from 
what we see in post-Oslo cultural production. The former, according to 
Kanaana, echoed frustration or mirrored deprecatory self-representations 
that reflected people’s inability to challenge the occupation.40 Post-Oslo 
black humor, on the other hand, emerges from a context of social and 
political fragmentation, stagnation, and disenchantment. It is a reflection 
of the paradoxical juxtaposition of colonial and post-colonial realities, a 
predicament that Anani describes as “schizophrenic” in this issue. 
We suggest, however, that dealing with the unbearable through irony, 
intimacy, and humor highlights artists’ and people’s quest for a normal life 
despite the abnormality around them. This quest is echoed in the work of 
writers such as Suad Amiri and Liana Bader, but also, to an extent, in some of 
the final poetry of the late Mahmoud Darwish.41 One of the most prominent 
examples of this genre is arguably Elia Suleiman’s semi-autobiographical 
film The Time That Remains, in which the filmmaker portrays Palestinian 
history since 1948 through detachment, irony, and black humor.42
In 2007, Rancière illustrated his understanding of political art as 
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“dissensus” by referencing Suleiman’s work.43 Rancière finds that Suleiman 
disputes the dominant regime of representation that reserves fiction and “the 
luxury of playing with words and images” for Israelis, and limits Palestinian 
cinematic expressions to the medium of the documentary film. By producing 
a darkly comic film about Palestinians’ everyday life under occupation, 
Suleiman reworks hegemonic aesthetic frames and potentially activates 
new radical sensibilities and subjectivities. The spectators are confronted 
not with pedagogical political art in which the artist teaches them. Instead 
the spectators’ senses and aesthetics are challenged so that they themselves 
can imagine something new. It is this disruption, this reworking, that, in 
Rancière’s understanding, makes art political.
Reflecting on his own art practice, Elia Suleiman finds that 
There is still some work to be done about “dismantling the flag.” I 
am trying to deconstruct this imposed national image, this image 
constructed by all these cultural actors who are always droning on 
about what Palestine means to them and who seem to fear that if this 
image disappears their artistic inspirations will disappear with it.”44
This urge to “dismantle the flag” and go beyond the forms and content 
of classic nationalist resistance art marks not only Suleiman’s, but also other 
contemporary Palestinian cultural production. In this issue, Toukan and 
Anani discuss the Palestinian art scene, and the developments in it that 
break with classic nationalist tropes. 
Similarly, Sunaina Maira found that the younger generation of 
Palestinians in Israel, the West Bank, and Jerusalem are challenging the 
political consensus.45 This post-Oslo generation, she argues, is disillusioned 
with existing political frameworks, in particular with that of post-Oslo state 
building, but also, to a certain extent, with a confined narrow conceptualiza-
tion of resistance art. Some of the rappers she interviewed expressed being 
stifled by the demands on them to produce “proper” nationalistic, political, 
or resistance music.46 They take issue with the limiting of culture and cultural 
production to a narrow nationalist conceptualization of resistance, which 
could constrain artistic and political creativity. The young Palestinians that 
Maira interviewed, as well as our interviewees in Lebanon, are engaged in 
“dissensus.” They strive to shift the parameters and aesthetics of politics and, 
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in doing so, fashion novel youth political cultures. These youth subcultures, 
by operating outside the hegemonic Palestinian cultural field of classic 
nationalist resistance art, reorder and rework “the frame of our perceptions 
and the dynamism of our affects.”47
The diversity of post-Oslo Palestinian cultures of resistance described 
above propose seemingly “normal(ized),” “apolitical,” or “a-nationalist” art 
which does not thrive on pre-established tropes of resistance against Israeli 
occupation, siege, and settler colonialism. In Palestine, the normal is the 
exception and the abnormal (of occupation) is the everyday. Consequently, 
resistance and classic nationalist art function as cultural hegemonic meta-
frames. Prioritizing and seeking the normal, the mundane and seemingly 
“apolitical” or “a-nationalist,” on the other hand, disrupts common sense 
and reorders the realm of the sensible. It is thus through such dissenting 
aesthetics, which operate as politics of the senses and of affect, that new 
subjectivities, identities, and imaginaries can emerge. 
Cultures of Resistance: Contributions to This Special Issue
Most contributions in this issue revolve around whether, why, and how art 
and cultural production function as resistance or “dissensus” or alterna-
tively become a form of normalization or consensus, with a focus on the 
Palestinian case. Adila Laïdi-Hanieh argues that the 100 Shaheed-100 Lives 
memorial exhibition, which portrayed the lives of one hundred Palestinian 
martyrs, was able to create a “dissensus.” It endowed the martyrs  with 
an individuated, ordinary humanity despite the occupation. This newly 
visible subject ruptures the regime of visibility of Palestinians abstracted 
in a nationalist collective, or as militant noise. It indexes political rights to 
life itself, not to factional affiliation or heroics. 
Laïdi-Hanieh stresses the exhibition’s “indeterminacy of the political 
effect on audiences.” While some attributed a strong political dimension to 
the memorial, others blamed it as contributing to depoliticizing and normal-
izing death under occupation. What might constitute a “dissensus” with the 
ordinary in one community might well serve the consensus of another. By 
presenting martyrs as ordinary people rather than heroes, suicide bombers, 
or terrorists, the 100 Shaheed-100 Lives exhibition disrupted and challenged 
both Palestinian and the international aesthetic regimes and representa-
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tions. Yet other Palestinian cultures of resistance might better conform to 
the standards and tastes of the international art scene.
Toukan’s interview with Anani engages this question of consumption, 
audiences, and commodification of art. In their contribution, they consider 
how the global art market influences local Palestinian art practices, as well 
as the risks of co-optation and commodification. Ultimately, Anani argues 
that international curators and museums have become obsessed with 
symbolic representations of Palestine and the Palestinian struggle, such 
as the wall, checkpoints, or Palestinian refugees. This commodification of 
Palestinian oppression “turns artists into ‘sentuaris,’” and blocks alternative 
political imaginaries. In this case, again, the global art market maintains and 
reproduces the consensus of the established aesthetic regime. Catering to 
broader international audiences, it recycles established hegemonic symbols 
of checkpoints or the wall, thus reifying and normalizing the Palestinian 
as victim. As such, global art settings and market dynamics can actually 
contribute to preventing “dissensus.” They might be blind to alternative 
artistic interventions or they may commodify and imprison resistance art 
into established political and commercial structures. 
The role of different audiences and their symbolic and aesthetic 
references is a theme that Rania Jawwad takes up in her article “‘Aren’t 
We Human?’ Normalizing Palestinian Performances.” She analyzes how 
the Palestinian theater project, The Gaza Mono-Logues, is framed and 
performed for and toward a world audience. Jawwad maintains that “the 
anticipated spectator’s gaze shapes the ways in which practitioners frame 
their performances.” Palestinian cultural production, its aesthetic forms, 
frames, and contents, is situated within and responds to broader global 
financial, discursive, and aesthetic structures. More specifically, Jawwad 
argues that the play’s main actor’s “plea ‘Aren’t we human?’ speaks to the 
ways in which Palestinian theater production in the occupied territories 
is embedded within a performance-based political sphere.” Her article 
brings to light the discrepancy that this “performance-based logic” entails. 
Gaza Mono-Logues are framed within a humanitarian discourse so as to be 
seen and heard by international audiences. The art itself, the Mono-Logues, 
however, documents the daily violence of Israeli settler colonialism and 
military occupation.
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A neat juxtaposing of “local” versus “global,” as Jawwad’s contribu-
tion shows, is misleading and overlooks how different aesthetic regimes or 
cultural hegemonies are in fact closely interwoven. What Rancière terms 
“the distribution of the sensible,” or what is possible to be heard, seen, felt, 
and done, does not happen in isolated cultures or communities, nicely sealed 
off from each other. Rather, the conditions and contexts for the possibility 
of perception are set on a global stage. The global spectator is part of the 
Palestinian stage, and what is legible, sensible, and thus possible “here” 
depends also on the “there.” 
Craig Larkin’s discussion of the multiple and ambiguous functions of 
resistance graffiti also highlights the role of different local and international 
art practices, discourses, and audiences. He takes issue with the work of 
internationally celebrated graffiti artists, such as Banksy. By performing 
“resistance art,” Banksy’s work conforms to the consensus of the international 
aesthetic regime prescribed to “political art.” His graffiti works have received 
much praise from international solidarity circles, but local perceptions, 
as Larkin shows, are much more critical. Palestinians (in particular East 
Jerusalemites who are the focus of his study), whose lives and livelihoods 
have been destroyed by the wall, might express their resistance and use the 
wall differently. They tend not to rely on internationally legible symbolic 
imagery such as checkpoints, peace doves, or balloons flying over the wall. 
Instead, they engage with and reflect on daily problems and grassroots 
initiatives, such as the Palestinian prisoners’ hunger strikes. They use 
different slogans, aesthetics, and artistic expression, and might even use 
the wall for commercial advertising to gain their livelihoods. The various 
“wall interventions,” Larkin writes, “attest to the paradoxical predicaments 
of Palestinians and the different audiences they hope to address.” Overall, 
Larkin’s account of the varied uses and audiences of the wall engages pow-
erfully the debate on resistance and normalization.
El-Guabli, in his discussion of Moroccan prison writings, provides a 
lucid example of resistance art. In Ahmed Marzouki’s and Aziz BineBine’s 
writings the prison becomes “a space that the detainees managed to tame, 
conquer, and surpass.” The effects that the prison and regime authorities had 
intended for the prisoners, to render them powerless and without agency, 
are defied. El-Guabli also stresses that the authors’ “hidden transcripts of 
resistance” have influenced Moroccan society more broadly. By publicly 
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demonstrating the limits and failures of the state’s authoritarian policies to 
break the prisoners’ will, these writings contribute to “helping Moroccans 
reconstruct and reinterpret their modern history.”
Nassar, in her contribution, also shows the crucial role played by 
cultural production in countering the political and geographical isolation 
of Palestinians in Israel in the 1950s and 1960s. Palestinian intellectuals in 
Israel, through publications in Arabic supported by the Israeli Communist 
Party such as al-Ittihad and al-Jadid, firmly inscribed themselves in the 
anticolonial and anti-imperialist struggles that were taking place around 
the Afro-Asian worlds. These publications, which featured writings by 
prominent intellectuals such as Emile Habibi, Mahmoud Darwish, and 
Salim Jubran, countered Zionist narratives by drawing a clear connection 
between Israel and other imperialist and colonial forces. These publica-
tions hosted revolutionary poetry and intellectual productions, often in 
the shape of translations of anticolonial intellectual leaders’ writings such 
as Nkrumah or Kenyatta. They also featured debates on the role of Arabic, 
poetry, and literature in resistance struggles and cultural liberation, especially 
in Algeria. The poetic, political, and intellectual discourses employed in the 
publications acted simultaneously as affective and political registers, which 
connected Palestinian political and intellectual figures, and more gener-
ally Palestinians in Israel, to the wider wave of anticolonial and liberation 
movements around the world. 
Tawil-Souri and Aouragh’s article on “intifada 3.0” is interested in the 
dialectics between the local and global. Situating their analysis in a theo-
retical framework of settler colonialism, they counter celebratory stances, 
which regard the internet as a place of borderless resistance. They instead 
stress that material realities also limit the seemingly unlimited worldwide 
web. Palestinian internet resistance takes place within and against different 
political structures of oppression (Israeli settler colonialism, factionalism, the 
PA, and Hamas), as well as global-capitalist structures of “cyber-colonialism, 
whose roots are deeply embedded in local and international interests.” They 
conclude that if “an intifada 3.0 [is to] serve as the model of a new paradigm 
of resistance in our hyper-capitalist global yet disparate and asymmetrical 
new network age,” it would have to confront both Israeli settler colonialism 
as well as global cyber-colonialism.
In sum, the articles in this issue offer rich material that complicate 
and nuance the relationship between art and politics. The analyses warn 
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against romanticizing resistance and instead use resistance as a “diagnostic 
of power” to understand broader dynamics of oppression and control.48 
Some contributions highlight the important role that political and global 
economic structures play in delineating possibilities and limitations for dif-
ferent cultures of resistance to emerge. Others point to the engagements and 
links between politics, affect, and aesthetics. Cultural production, whether 
in the forms of openly political graffiti, an ironic or humorous engagement 
with the paradoxes of normality under occupation, an exhibition that 
humanizes the hero, or intimate political prison writings, has the potential 
to challenge our senses, and generate new affects and political imaginaries
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